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Abstract  
This paper explores the causal links between the role of public finance and Bihar’s 
growth and development in the last decade; and argues that these links are tenuous. 
Bihar’s growth acceleration precedes the ‘policy reforms’ in public finance based on 
the ‘good governance’ agenda initiated since 2005-06. However, the constraints on 
sustaining efforts to close Bihar’s development gap with the rest of India stems from 
the nature of the growth process in its regional, sectoral and social dimensions and 
the contradictory means and ends of the ‘policy reforms’ in public finance. Together, 
this has not only prevented the economic growth to add to public coiffeurs of the 
state but also occluded the role of tax institutions.   
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I Recapitulating Bihar’s Growth and ‘Good Governance’ Story 
It is often argued that the NDA government under Nitish Kumar’s chief-
ministership since November 2005 has fared reasonably well on the growth front 
with a paradigm shift in the quality of governance and law and order in the state’ 
with efforts to improve the delivery of service at all levels Kumar (2009). Such 
laudatory commentators believing in the resurgence of sushasan (good 
governance) have noted that the government has not been able to ensure that this 
‘development’ paradigm ‘percolate down to the masses and emphasized the 
‘deplorable human conditions and high incidence of poverty’. This has led to 
introspective assertion that ‘much needs to be done to create an inclusive growth 
model’ (ibid: emphasis added). Such views are premised on an article of faith that 
indeed there has been an economic turnaround in Bihar through sushasan and it is 
now only a matter of  time for the ‘inclusion’ of the more deprived castes and 
classes of Bihar society in this process of social and economic ‘resurgence’. The 
growth is believed to have been an outcome of sushasan since 2005 because of 
improvement in law and order, increased public expenditure to build 
infrastructure and capabilities and creation of an ‘investor-friendly’ environment. 
This explanation is flawed as it is based on flawed periodisation and has severe 
analytical lacunae and data gaps. It is largely based on analysis of the year 2006-
07 which is an outlier in the entire data set. Such analysis also fails to take into 
cognizance the new patterns of crime and the lack of visible investment as a result 
of the ‘investor-friendly’ environment and the social invisibility of growth beyond 
affluent parts of Patna, the capital of the state (Das Gupta 2010). 
 
Bihar's economy saw a fluctuating pattern of growth in total GSDP since 2000-01. 
The primary sector has been growing at a highly volatile 3.4 percent with decline 
in sector share every year. The standard method of studying the broad 
classifications of primary, secondary and tertiary sectors and disaggregating each 
sector’s share in GSDP shows that the decade since 1999-2000 has been primarily 
driven by growth in the secondary sector (13.9 percent) mainly due to growth and 
expansion in sector share of construction (trend growth at 26.5 percent and a 17.7 
percent average annual increase in sector share) and a slower but less volatile 
growth in the tertiary sector (trend growth at 8.2 percent) due to growth and 
expansion of sector share in communication (trend growth at 23.1 percent and a 
14.4 percent annual increase in sector share) and trade, hotel and restaurants 
(trend growth at 13.7 percent and a 5.8 percent annual increase in sector share). 
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Figure 1A demonstrates that the growth acceleration in Bihar had preceded the 
NDA government at least by two to three years as the acceleration in growth in 
this decade starts from 2002-03 and becomes pronounced in the period between 
2003-04 and 2005-06 The first set of ‘reforms’ under sushasan started from 
January 2006 with time-lags for design, adoption, implementation and impact. So, 
if one has to look for structural breaks due to policy change, it would be more 
appropriate to look for growth trends since 2007.  
Figure 1A also shows that the period between 2005-06 and 2007-08 was the 
highest period of economic growth in Bihar. The period 2006-07 to 2008-09 – the 
three full years of NDA rule in the CSO dataset, shows a decline compared to the 
period 2005-06 to 2007-08, even if we go by the extraordinarily high figures 
reported for 2006-07. Thus it is difficult to find any indication of structural break 
after 2007. Economic growth trends do not map linearly to ‘regime change’. With 
these qualifiers, the growth period under consideration does not come across as a 
miracle. It reflects a continuum of 3-year systemic cycles in post-bifurcation 
Bihar since 2001-02, the year in which Bihar saw a sudden plummeting of its 
economy due to bifurcation. The years 2002-03, 2004-05 and 2006-07 are periods 
of more than 10 percent growth in this cycle even without any adjustment of the 
Central Statistical Organisation (CSO) data. If one takes into consideration that 
2006-07 is an outlier (and the last two years in the series in the CSO are 
provisional and quick estimates and prone to change), one could conclude that 
there has been no major change under sushasan in the systemic cycle of economic 
growth in the last decade. In fact, between 1993-94 and 2000-01, Bihar’s 
economy had grown faster than the Indian economy. In this period, while India as 
a whole had recorded a longer period average growth rate of 5.75 percent, Bihar’s 
economy had grown at 6.09 percent (EPW Research Foundation 2009 p28 Table 
8.2). This came to an abrupt halt due to the ‘economic shock’ of bifurcation of the 
state in 2000. Read with these patterns since 1994-95, the CSO data since 1993-
94 till 2008-09 points to the possibility of a structural break in the early 1990s. 
Figure 1B shows that Bihar had already caught up with the national average in 
2004-05 and overtook it in the subsequent period. Thus Bihar’s growth since 
2002-03 can be interpreted as the resumption of a long fluctuating and volatile 
movement towards a higher growth continuum that had started since 1994-95 but 
was interrupted by the impact of bifurcation in 2001-02 (Figure 1C).  
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Figure 1A 
 
Source: Das Gupta (2010) 
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Figure 1B 
 
Source: Das Gupta 2010 
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Figure 1C 
 
 
 
More than 74 percent of the growth in GSDP in any period between 1999-2000 to 
2008-09 consists of the sectoral contributions of four sectors – agriculture and 
allied activities, construction, communication, and, trade, hotel and restaurants; 
while the rest of the sectors together account for just a quarter of the growth 
process. Agricultural growth was much more important in the overall explanation 
of GSDP growth in the period: 1999-2000 – 2004-05 when it accounted for 17 
percent of overall growth in GSDP. In the subsequent period, despite the 
inconsistent figure of 34 percent growth in agriculture and allied activities 
reported in 2006-07; in the three years from 2006-07 to 2008-09, agricultural 
growth only contributed to 6 percent of overall growth of GSDP along with a 
faster decline in sector share. Once we remove the inconsistent figures of 2006-07, 
sectoral volatility in the period after 2004-05 shows a four-fold increase. Thus the 
role of agricultural policy since 2005-06 can hardly be adjudged to have made any 
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positive impact on the macroeconomics of agriculture. The contribution of 
construction in overall growth saw a remarkable rise from 11 percent between 
1999-2000 and 2004-05 to 29 percent between 2004-05 and 2008-09. However, 
the peak period of share of construction in the overall growth process was  in 
2004-05. In the three years between 2006-07 and 2008-09, the contribution of 
construction to overall growth declined to 21 percent. Thus the growth spurt in 
construction precedes the policies adopted in and after 2005-06, and has very little 
to do with the pros and cons of the NDA government’s public expenditure led 
construction drive. The contribution of communication to Bihar’s overall GSDP 
growth doubled from 4 percent between 1999-2000 and 2004-05 to 9 percent 
between 2004-05 and 2008-09. However this leap is also in the year 2004-05 and 
remained at that level in subsequent years. This has also been one of the less 
volatile sectors of the economy all through the decade under consideration. The 
expansion in communication would find a more plausible explanation in the 
‘telecom boom’ in India since 2004-05 than to any particular state-specific policy 
after 2005-06. The contribution of trade, hotels and restaurants to economic 
growth in is the single largest sectoral contribution to overall growth (36 percent 
between 1999-00 and 2008-09), consistently reflected over every period in the last 
decade (Table 1.1). 
Table 1.1: Sectoral Contributions to GSDP Growth 
Period 
1999-
00 to 
2008-
09 
1999-
00 to 
2004-
05 
2004-
05 to 
2008-
09 
2005-
06 to 
2008-
09 
2006-07 
to 2008-
09 
Percentage 
Growth in 
GSDP 
7.5 4.4 12.8 15.1 12.6 
Percentage contribution to overall growth of GSDP 
Agriculture 13% 17% 14% 17% 6% 
6 
 
Construction 24% 11% 29% 22% 21% 
Communication 7% 4% 9% 7% 9% 
Trade 36% 49% 33% 36% 41% 
Rest 22% 21% 22% 20% 26% 
 
 
Moreover, absolute contribution of trade, hotels and restaurants is reflected in the 
expansion of the sector by almost 6 percentage points in a decade-long secular 
expansion with sectoral volatility remaining relatively low in every period. In size, 
trade, hotels and restaurants is equal to the entire secondary sector in Bihar.  
Contrary to dominant explanations about the causal link of construction and 
communication spurt incubating a boom in small trade, the spurt in trade precedes 
the spurt in construction and communication.  Neither can this spurt in trade be 
mapped linearly to 'feelings of safety' due to restoration of 'law and order' per se 
as the acceleration in trade precedes by many years the 'law and order' measures 
of the NDA government. In fact, trade had been the single driver of overall 
growth in Bihar till Bihar caught up with the 'communication boom' in 2004-05 
and the subsequent spurt in construction with the rest of India.  This robustness of 
trend in the growth of trade regardless of the nature of policy regimes has been a 
‘peculiarity’ of India’s economic transformation (Mazumdar 2010). Bihar’s 
growth trajectory does not buck this trend.   
The structural vulnerability in Bihar’s economy emanate from two sources: first, 
the ‘growth centres’ in this decade have been the more ‘integrated’ components of 
the service sector which is primarily driven by conditions beyond the remit of 
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state governments and in face of volatility, the government has no writ or policy 
tools in its sushasan agenda to address the outcomes of such volatile fluctuations. 
Second, the sushasan agenda in its conceptual embedding in the ‘efficiency’ 
paradigm of ‘monoeconomics’ is committed to more ‘integration’ with growth-
enhancement primarily based on large infrastructure building that facilitates this 
particular kind of growth.     This ‘efficiency’ in the ‘monoeconomics’ of the 
dominant consensus (Hirschman 1981) can only be conceived in an economic 
paradigm where four assertions have to be valid -  first, that society is an 
aggregation of individuals; two, individuals engage in maximizing rational 
behaviour (even if constrained by bounded rationality); three, this behaviour 
results in the creation and maintenance of equilibrium (though equilibrium can 
often only be analyzed at the microeconomic level); four, these behavioural 
premises imply that markets achieve (constrained) efficiency for all individuals 
and by aggregation for society. Skepticism is unavoidable about a policy approach 
that sees ‘growth’ as inter-temporal utility maximization by individual economic 
agents designated in their roles as savers, investors and consumers rather than a 
complex outcome of the interaction of movement in ‘capital accumulation, labour 
force and technological progress’ (McFarlane 1989).  
II Public Finance in Bihar 
The Bihar growth story coincided with a conjuncture in India’s social 
transformation story with the mainstream recognition of the overwhelming 
evidence that India’s growth since the 1980s had failed to generate adequate 
employment and improve aggregate productivity of labour rather than just in a 
few chosen sectors like heavy manufacturing in the pre-reform era and software, 
food-processing and low-value service areas like call centres in the post-reform 
period (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2002). This is the most obvious symptom of 
the lacuna in Indian economic development. Economic policy discussion in India 
had relegated employment generation to a subsidiary position since 1991 with the 
emphasis on ‘efficiency’. By 2004, the debate had transformed to contend that in 
India ‘liberalisation’ needs a ‘human face’ and should be accompanied by greater 
concern for the plight of the ‘masses’ (Economic Survey 2004-05). to paved way 
for a soft version by the middle of the first decade of the 21st century in India with 
a synthesis of policy advice deriving from the contemporary humanist libertarian 
views of ‘development as freedom’ and the ‘entitlements approach’ (Sen 1982, 
1999), Rawlsian approaches of giving priority to basic liberties over the more 
equality-oriented demands (Rawls 1971) and the post-materialist arguments 
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derived from theorists like Inglehart (1977, 1997). This led to the coining of 
‘inclusive growth’ as the consensual slogan of soft neoliberalism spanning 
international funding agencies, donor and recipient organizations working in the 
social sector, the federal and state governments in India. Thus the role of the state 
was instrumentally revised to focus on public finance with ‘development gaps’ 
measured in terms of gaps in Per Capita Development Expenditure (PCDE). 
Adopting this techno-managerial framework of ‘managing development’, 
'catching up' on development expenditure was set out as a prime goal of sushasan. 
Thus stimulating growth through public spending, despite the techno-managerial 
policies deriving from monoeconomics that informed the sushasan agenda, were 
conceived on neo-Keynesian precepts of increasing development expenditure to 
enable structural economic transformation, reflecting an inherent contradiction in 
the political goals and the policies adopted to achieve the same based on 
sophisticated versions of neoliberal tenets emerging from new institutional 
economics and new political economy. The contradiction lies in the conflict 
between the very different means and ends of the neoliberal service delivery state 
and the neo-Keynesian transformative state. In a peculiar atrophy of reasoned 
causation, PCDE became a co-determinant of double-digit growth figures in Bihar 
(eg Gupta 2010) without any examination of the basis and direction of causation. 
In spite of the quantitative gap in PCDE between Bihar and the rest of India 
(Figure 2A), the compound annual growth rate of PCDE in Bihar has been 16.8 
percent since 2004-05, while that of PCDE for the country has been 13.9 percent 
(Table 2.1) . Thus PCDE was growing faster than the national average in Bihar. 
Sustaining this effort at public expenditure on ‘development’ is important, but 
attributing it to specifics of the policies of the NDA government needs 
qualification. 2004-05 and 2005-06 were exceptional years for Bihar’s fisc due to 
political reasons. The Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) government in Bihar fell in 
2004-05, followed by President’s rule and elections. The results led to a hung 
assembly and a new government could not be formed. In the period of President’s 
rule and the months leading up to elections, there were strictures on spending. As 
there was no government in place by the end of the financial year, there was no 
proper sanctioning authority leading to low expenditure both in plan and non-plan 
components. The CAG Report (Civil) for 2004-05 noted that delays in submission 
in utilization certificates led to a low disbursal-low expenditure cycle. In 2005-06, 
Bihar was again under President’s rule. Elections were held in the last quarter of 
2005 and the NDA government came to power in November 2005. A large part of 
expenditure was incurred only in the last quarter of the financial year due to pre-
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election spending strictures. If this qualification is borne in mind, it would be 
clear from Figure 2.1 that the year 2004-05 is an outlier and the accelerated 
growth in PCDE dates back to 2002-03 and runs out of steam by 2007-08. Thus 
the sophisticated conjectures of the causal link between economic growth and 
sushasan, based on the official claims of substantial stepping up of development 
expenditure since 2005-06, is flawed. The causal inks between stepping up of 
development expenditure and economic growth is highly contested in the 
theoretical literature as the determinants of these two economic variables are 
different. The neo-Keynesian argument has often been premised on the impact of 
increased development expenditure on investment. This at best is a necessary 
condition but not a sufficient condition for increasing labour productivity and 
thereby leading to growth. The effectiveness of this causal link is dependent on 
the social structure of production and consumption of the economy (Fine and 
Leopold 1993). In the case of Bihar since 2005-06, investment has not really 
taken off in this period till date. Trends in labour productivity show hardly any 
significant structural break in the period of accelerated growth (Chanda 2011).  
The relative share of development expenditure in the state government's total 
expenditure increased since 2005-06 to reach a peak of 64.79 percent in 2007-08, 
but fell to 48.35 percent in 2008-09 and is expected to fall further to almost 2001-
02 levels (41.83 percent) in 2009-10 (47.67 percent) and 2010-11 (43.67 percent), 
according to the state government's own budgetary estimates (Table 2.1).  
Table 2.1: Development Expenditure in Bihar 
  
Development 
Expenditure* 
(Rs Crore) 
Total 
Budgetary 
Expenditure  
(Rs Crore) 
Percentage 
Share of 
Development 
Expenditure 
in Total 
Expenditure  
2001-02 7898.80 18882.33 41.83 
2002-03 9290.10 15505.53 59.91 
2003-04 10127.00 22481.90 45.05 
2004-05 9095.00 20058.00 45.34 
2005-06 12988.00 22568.48 57.55 
2006-07  17304.00 27136.47 63.77 
2007-08  20456.00 31571.19 64.79 
2008-09 17978.00 37181.26 48.35 
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2009-10 
(Revised 
Estimates) 
23622.00 49552.32 47.67 
2010-11 
(Budget 
Estimates) 
25226.00 57758.55 43.67 
Note: 1Crore = 10 Million; 
Source: Government of Bihar: Annual Budgets, Various Years 
 
Table 2.2: Per Capita Development Expenditure of Major Indian States 
State 
Per Capita Development Expenditure (Rs.) 
2001-
02 
2002-
03 
2003-
04 
2004-
05 
2005-
06 
2006-
07 
2007-
08 
Goa 8861 9507 10578 11766 13247 15098 15250 
Gujarat 3399 3007 3440 3508 3963 4615 4524 
Haryana 3195 2829 3795 3287 4097 5857 5979 
Punjab 2848 2514 3059 3133 3392 4947 5517 
Karnataka 2702 2705 2842 3503 4073 5216 5936 
Andhra 
Pradesh 2595 2542 2942 3132 3687 5026 6633 
Maharashtra 2516 2741 3182 3740 4184 4658 4626 
Tamil Nadu 2244 2591 2751 3173 3402 4711 5114 
Kerala 2091 2769 3048 3054 3233 4222 4291 
Jharkhand 1975 2439 2170 2790 3348 4046 3885 
Rajasthan 1885 2002 2440 2534 2810 3230 3505 
West 
1858 1525 1799 1833 2039 2420 2633 
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Bengal 
Madhya 
Pradesh 1808 1872 2285 2757 2925 2885 3109 
Chhattisgarh 1707 2059 4673 4130 3011 4409 4866 
Orissa 1612 1713 2072 1795 1980 2653 3021 
Uttar 
Pradesh 1112 1199 2278 1470 1793 2388 3007 
Bihar 943 1091 1168 1030 1447 2124 2184 
Source: State Finances: A Study of Budgets of 2008-09, Reserve Bank of India, 
2008 
 
Figure 2A:‘Development Gap’: Bihar and India 
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Beyond electoral equations and the specificities of social conditions in Bihar, the 
complete and absolute surrender to neoliberalism by the successive governments 
at the centre created a material basis for discontent at the state level on the 
question of development of low income states. But as long as the Rashtriya Janata 
Dal (RJD) of Laloo Prasad Yadav was in power, the full thrust of neoliberal 
policy implementation at the state level had been held at bay. Ironically, this had 
partly to do with the RJD’s ‘non-policies’ itself at the state level that led to the 
perception of its ‘failure to govern’. But it had much more to do with the centre’s 
paradigmatic shift to neoliberalism. The RJD government bore the brunt of the 
fiscal crisis at the state level unleashed by central policies of fiscal cuts in the 
1990s. While the impact on all state governments had been severe (Isaac and 
Ramakumar 2006), Bihar’ crisis was compounded by its historically high fiscal 
dependence on the centre and a mismatch between post-bifurcation shares of 
assets and liabilities.  The neoliberal assault on the state’s fisc reinforced the 
conditions of ‘backwardness’ traceable to the pre and post-independence history 
of the state being at the receiving end of policies that deepened regional inequality 
(Guruswamy 2007), central policies before and after liberalisation that reinforced 
undermining of state level institutions (Ghosh 2007), the reinforcement of 
regional disparity through sectoral approaches that failed to address the 
specificities of the social in the regional  (Ghosh and Das Gupta 2009) and the 
structural features of Bihar’s primarily feudal agrarian society (Das 1983).  The 
RJD government in its last tenure after presiding over the bifurcation of the state, 
remained trapped in fiscal crisis in a period of overall low economic growth and 
the check on expenditure after the ‘fodder scam’.  
 
The NDA government in contrast came to power at a time of  buoyant central 
revenues and easing of the fiscal crisis of the states in a high economic growth 
scenario that again had very little to do with the state government’s policies. This 
gave the necessary cushion for the NDA government to step up expenditure 
budgets and maintain the acceleration in development expenditure in its first two 
years. However, the biggest cushion came in the form of a revenue surplus 
accrued since 2003-04 due to the expenditure strictures till the NDA’s coming to 
power which has been outlined above. However, in the face of its hurried 
adoption of ‘fiscal responsibility’ legislation immediately after coming to power, 
the fiscal room to sustain the increase in development expenditure ran out with 
self- imposed limits on the revenue deficit and the fiscal deficit in keeping with 
strictures and patterns of expenditure in other states of India under fiscal 
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responsibility legislation (Isaac and Ramakumar op.cit). Expenditure compression 
became the norm for most budgetary outlays  and the compression of outlays in 
development expenditure followed in Bihar as soon as the revenue surplus ran out 
in 2007-08 (Figure 2A (i) to 2A(iv)). 
Figure 2A (i) 
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Figure 2A (ii) 
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Figure 2A (iii) 
Fiscal Deficit
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Figure 2A (iv) 
Development expenditure
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Expenditure  
Non-plan revenue expenditures on different major heads reflect the prioritization 
of maintaining existing social and economic institutions and infrastructure while 
revenue expenditure under plan heads reflect the recurring cost of creation of new 
institutions and infrastructure. The most significant and balanced increase in plan 
and non-plan revenue expenditure has been under the budget head of ‘general 
education’ but this has come at the cost of disproportional stagnancy in non-plan 
outlays and sporadic outlays in plan revenue outlays for existing infrastructure 
and institutions for medical and public health, water supply and sanitation (Figure 
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2B and 2C). The ‘rhetoric’ of policy announcements on ‘technical education’ is 
also not matched in the trend in budgeting priorities with stagnant revenue 
expenditure in the non-plan head. Thus the budgeting priorities reflect a move 
towards financial undermining of existing public institutions and infrastructure. 
 
 
Figure 2B  
Revenue Expenditure In Non-Plan Budget: Bihar
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Figure 2C 
Revenue Expenditure under State Plan
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The basis of distinction between revenue and capital expenditure has been 
questioned by economists, as both are overlapping in their functional purpose. 
Nevertheless, the capital outlays in plan and non-plan budget are exclusively 
geared towards creation of new infrastructure and resources. In the non-plan 
budget, the disproportional priority on policing in the state has led to falling 
public investment in public work and almost insignificant allocations to major 
irrigation (Figure 2D). In a state ravaged flood and majority of impoverished lives 
and livelihoods entirely dependent on monsoons, the low priority accorded to new 
investments in ‘major irrigation’ reflects the inherent methodological lacunae of 
the ‘inclusive growth’ agenda. The trend of decline in public work also reflects 
the low priority given to developing arterial infrastructure which is much more 
relevant in the sustaining of livelihoods and improvement of living conditions 
than point-to-point large scale infrastructure projects which accentuate disparities.  
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 Figure 2D 
Capital Outlay in Non-Plan Budget: Bihar
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 Figure 2E 
Capital Outlay in State Plan: Bihar 
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The capital outlay in the state plan reflects no significant  ‘investments’ in minor 
irrigation, welfare of SC/ST and OBCS, medical and public health, tourism 
(which is supposed to be ‘focus area of growth in the NDA policy objectives) and 
most importantly in Medical and Public Health. The only significant step up was 
on Rural Development Programmes with a plethora of schemes envisaged under 
the state plan. However, the decline in allocation in 2009-10 (budget estimates) to 
even this prioritized investment in ‘rural development’ head must be noted. The 
‘capacity to spend’ depends on the functioning of institutions of the state. Bihar, 
where historically the expenditure on institution building has been low, capital 
outlays in ‘rural development’ through schemes cannot be effective unless the 
various institutions of the state involved in the operationalisation of these schemes 
are enhanced. Thus a balanced approach in capital and revenue outlays is a 
minimum necessary condition for the schemes to take off and be sustainable. 
The government itself had argued that the adoption of fiscal responsibility 
legislation is primarily responsible for this scenario in its memorandum to the 
Thirteenth Finance Commission in 20081.  
                                                            
1  For an overview of the fallacies of fiscal conservatism in the context of India’s lop-sided 
development, see Bhaduri (2006); Patnaik (2000, 2006), Sethi (2009) 
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The other pillar of reforms has been based on the argument of accelerating ‘own 
resource mobilisation’ by the state government. However, it is precisely in the 
period of accelerated growth that the state’s policy reforms have had no impact on 
own resource mobilisation. The tax-GSDP ratio has been hovering around 5 
percent for the entire period of growth acceleration. The dependence on the 
central government for the state’s revenues has increased (Figure 2F) from 40 
percent in 2004-05 to 72 percent in 2008-09.  
Figure 2F 
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Even though the structural constraints on the economy are such that the 
Committee of experts given the task of envisioning in the medium term of how to 
go about this has hardly been able to recommend anything substantive except 
improvement of tax collection and tax resource management through use of 
information technology. But once again the basic question is whether tax 
collection can be improved with no major change in expenditure patterns on the 
source of the largest tax head – tax from sales and trade (Figures 2G and 2H)? 
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Figure 2G 
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Figure 2H 
Non-Plan Expenditure Budget for Tax heads
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The prioritization of expenditure in one basket ‘land revenue’ in both non-plan 
and plan heads over all other tax sources. Land revenue contributes between 1 to 
1.5 percent on average to tax revenue of the government (Economic Survey of 
Bihar: Various Years). Since land has historically been the ‘resource’ which has 
been fundamental to accumulation in Bihar, public investment in land revenue 
mobilization could be considered to be pragmatic. However, the potential for land 
revenue mobilization cannot be ascertained, leave alone explored unless land 
records can be updated and the nature of property right over each piece of 
recorded land can be ascertained. The assumed ‘neutrality’ of the state in this 
process (discussed in Section I)   is evident in the increase in allocation without 
any change in the existing structure of social institutions related to land. The NDA 
government soon after coming to power instituted a Land Reforms Commission 
which submitted its report in early 2008. The government has not implemented 
the recommendations of this report which among other issues delves into the 
institutional problems related to updating of land records. Under these 
circumstances, the demands from the early 1990s to allot land to the landless 
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(largely the section of people accorded Mahadalit status by the NDA government 
through another commission) and give parchadharis the actual kabza of their 
lands has been resurrected in a muted form. However, the fear of ‘land reforms’ 
even in a watered down form in the shape of possibility of updation of land 
records instigated a panic amongst the traditional and the nouveau elite which 
became ascribed as the prime cause of the NDA’s defeat in the by-elections in the 
state in September 2009 and the political leadership in government had to publicly 
assure the landowners of Bihar that there would be no land reform in Bihar. 
  
Figure 2I 
Revenue Expenditure In Non-Plan Budget: Bihar
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. Figure 2J 
Capital Outlay in State Plan of Bihar Govt.
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Figure 2K 
Revenue Expenditure under State Plan
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Fiscal Responsibility Legislation and Expenditure Policy 
Advocacy for fiscal austerity and cuts in expenditure since 1991 had paved way 
for ‘fiscal responsibility and budget management’ by 2004 through the aegis of 
the Twelfth Finance Commission. Thus hard ideology was paving way for a 
pragmatic techno-managerial approach (supposedly ‘free of ideology’) to 
structural socio-economic problems.  One of the first legislations the NDA 
government adopted after coming to power was the Bihar Fiscal Responsibility 
and Budget Management (BFRBM) Act 2006 in February 2006 limiting the level 
of borrowing and setting targets to bring the fiscal deficit down to the level of 3 
percent of GSDP and becoming a revenue surplus state by 2008-09. It must be 
noted that there is no economic rationale for the setting of the specific quantitative 
targets except a mechanical replication from the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 of the 
European Union (Govind Rao 2007). Why Bihar should be adopting fiscal targets 
that were developed in the specific context of the formation of the European 
Union is a question that the policymakers never grappled with. If the defense is 
that it just adopted the recommended draft of the Union Government in lieu of 
promises for writing off old debts, it is necessary to assess what benefits have 
accrued to the state as a result of the government fulfilling its targets. It is quite 
clear from the way that the BFRBM legislation was rushed through in Bihar 
within three months of the NDA government coming to power that there was any 
considered deliberation about the impact of this legislation on its promised agenda.   
The Fiscal Responsibility legislation was part of a more comprehensive fiscal 
reform initiated since 2005-06 by the first NDA government. The states  aim of 
these reforms had been to step up planned expenditure with a high component of 
capital expenditure as well as expenditure on operation and maintenance. The 
objective was to finance this expenditure as far as possible from internal resources 
without resorting to huge borrowing along with institutionalizing of fiscal 
responsibility norms based on the architecture of ‘sound finance’ 
The concerns of policymakers who initiated the reforms were informed by the 
following fiscal outcomes: the fiscal deficit had been consistently hovering 
around 5.5 percent.  The government was carrying large amount of unutilised 
funds.  It took an enormous loan which remained unutilised. The state had a 
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revenue surplus with low level of planned expenditure and even lower level of 
capital expenditure. Accumulated debt was rising.   
The emphasis was clearly on expenditure rationalisation rather than revenue 
mobilisation as is evident from figures 2I to 2K with management of debt and 
deficit being the prime focus. This mismatch in stated political aims and adoption 
of neoliberal fiscal strategy reflects a severe constraint on autonomy due to the 
increasing financial centralisation at the level of the union government (and by-
passing of the second tier of government) in the post-liberalisation period. 
Sectoral Impact of Tax Reforms on VAT  
The tax ‘reforms’ in Bihar started with the introduction of VAT on April 1, 20032. 
The NDA government as part of its ‘fiscal’ reform expanded and rationalized the 
VAT in 2005-06. This was along with cut in stamp duties to fulfill federal 
government conditionality for grants towards the Jawaharlal Nehru Urban 
Renewal Mission. However there was no significant change in tax buoyancy in 
any category of the state government’s taxes after 2005-06 except for a single 
year 2007-08 (Table 2.3).  
Table 2.3: Overview of Buoyancy of Major State Government Taxes 
Tax 
2002-03  2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08  2008-09 
Sales 
Tax/VAT  
1.31  -0.34 1.47 -0.88 0.86 3.48 0.75
State Excise 
Duty  
0.10  -0.43 0.15 1.79 0.85 6.01 1.15
                                                            
2 Contrary to the dominant assertions within contemporary public economics in India, universal 
‘efficiency’ considerations did not inform the design and implementation of VAT in various parts 
of the world. In metropolitan Europe, VAT was a mode of ‘economic integration’ of homogenous 
countries. In the transition economies of Eastern Europe, VAT was made a precondition to join the 
EU. In Latin America, VAT was geared towards the ‘outward orientation’ of economic policies. 
There is no VAT in the USA. Michigan has single business tax. USA has sales tax which varies 
across states from 5 percent to 10 percent). It is only in the developing economies of Asia and 
Africa – that the economic rationale of VAT – ‘efficiency arguments’ has been central to its 
adoption with a total occlusion of ‘equity’ VAT was also based on the rationale that it provides 
incentives for the unregistered sector to come into the tax net.  
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Stamp and 
Registration 
Duty  
1.29 1.87 -0.42 6.99 0.37 1.29 1.87
Motor 
Vehicles 
Tax  
-4.36 4.45 -1.71 8.09 0.35 -4.36 4.45
Taxes on 
Goods and 
Passengers  
0.26 3.14 1.18 3.16 1.43 -0.06 0.26
Source: Economic Survey, Government of Bihar, 2009-10 
Table 2.4: Commodity Base and Spread Of VAT in Bihar after Tax Reforms 
Commodity  Contribution 
to Total 
Growth (%) 
in VAT 
Collection 
Trend 
Real 
Growth 
Rate (%) 
in VAT 
Collection 
   Average 
Share in 
Total 
VAT 
Collection
2006-
07  
2007-
08  
2008-
09  
2009-
10  
Unregistered 
dealers  and works 
contractors  
16.91 70.99 36.65 46.91 127.86 80.31 3.46 
Petro products  16.6 7.34 12.6 16.58 19.24 14.12 32.87 
Cement  9.55 22.27 44.03 19.95 23.02 64.26 6.23 
Telephone  7.17 39.58 58.19 151.79 45.74 -2.95 2.63 
Indian Made 
Foreign Liquor  
6.76 27.16 46.16 1.49 59.85 56.05 3.62 
Works contract 
and tds  5.46 31.71 65.49 100.51 31.02 15.76 2.5 
Four wheelers & 
chasis of 
automobile  
4.97 18.46 94.59 27.4 12.35 57.04 3.91 
Country liquor  3.63 39.52 26.54 68.15 33.2 63.64 1.33 
Coal  2.73 20.56 34.23 66.31 13.83 25.36 1.93 
Two and three 
wheelers  2.64 16.35 34.1 13.01 30.46 36.65 2.34 
FMCG  2.48 8.85 31.53 15.67 22.79 15.91 4.06 
Pan masala  2.04 131.6 38.27 280.36 161.83 59.1 0.22 
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 Commodities 
(whose 
commoditywise 
contributions to 
total growth is less 
than 2 % but 
higher than 1%)  
10.88 14.66 29.19 28.3 19.63 28.67 10.3 
Various 
Commodities 
(whose 
commoditywise 
contributions to 
total growth is less 
than 1 %)  
11.62 8.54 13.33 17.11 23.73 12.25 18.9 
Commodities 
registering decline 
in total growth  
-3.44 -9.55 29.32 24.79 -14.33 -6.35 5.7 
 
Table 2.5: Commodity wise Contribution to Total Growth in VAT Collection 
Contribution to Total 
Growth 
2006-07 to 2009-10 
more than 15% Unregistered Dealer and Works Contractor, Petroleum Products 
5% to 15% Cement, Telephone, Indian Made Foreign Liquor, Works contract and 
tds  
2% to 5% Four Wheelers & Chasis Of Automobile, Country Liquor, Coal, Two 
And Three Wheelers, FMCG, Pan Masala  
1% to 2% Tobacco, Iron & Steel, Tractors, Ghee & Vanaspati, Drugs And 
Medicines, Electronic Goods, Biscuits, Food grain 
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0% to 1% Tyres & Tubes, Tools, Beverages, Hosiery And Ready Made, 
Lubricants, Consumer Durables, Sanitary Fittings & Tiles, Electrical 
Goods, Computer, Battery, Paper, Asbestos, Not Tagged With Any 
Commodity, Furniture, Paints, Edible Oil, Auto-parts, Bicycle, 
Footwear , Fast Food And Cooked Food, Tea & Coffee, Hardware, 
Marble And Granites, Entertainment Tax, Grocery items, Others @ 
12.5, Electricity Duty, Jewellery, Advertisement Tax, Crude Oil, 
Utensils, Stationery, Bricks, Glasses , Engine & Motors, Stone Chips 
And Ballast, Luxury And Hotel, Bhujia, Fertiliser & Insecticides, Sport 
Goods, Processed Vegetable & Food., Others @ 4%, Diesel Oil, 
Plywood, Watch & Clock, Plyboard, Matches, Spectacles, Hawai, 
Chappals, Commodities that are not listed 
less than 0% 
(reflecting Decline)  
Sewing Machine, Fire Works, Petrol, Gun & Rifles, Dry Fruits, Hide & 
Skin, Timber, Crockery, Cutlery, Glassware & Ceramic ware, Moulded 
Luggage, Kerosene, Others(Tax Free), Staple Yarn, LPG, Plastic 
Goods, Unregistered Dealer and Others  
 
Contrary to the rationale of VAT, unregistered dealers (other than works 
contractors), have not found in VAT an adequate incentive.  Almost 45% of the 
total growth in sales tax collection after implementation of the changes in VAT 
which were implemented in 2005-06 is accounted for by ‘sin goods’ - petro 
products, coal; and country liquor and other goods like electricity duties. These 
together accounts for around 50 percent of the existing sales tax collection in 
Bihar. Thus significant chunk of the tax net and tax base of Bihar’s consumption 
driven economy is in keeping with the typical patterns of a low-production  low-
consumption economy (Tables 2.4 and 2.5). 
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District Level Patterns of Economic Growth and Tax Collection 
 
Table 2.6: District Composition of Growth in Bihar’s Sales Tax Collection (2006-
07 – 2009-10) 
District  
Contribution 
to Total 
growth in 
VAT 
collection 
Average 
(%)Share 
of Total 
VAT 
collection  
Annual  
Variation 
in VAT 
collection 
(CV) 
Patna (75.99)  
75.99 85.51 25.47 
1%  to <=3% 
Vaishali (2.16), Muzaffarpur(1.87), 
Darbhanga(1.49),W. 
Champaran(1.46), Purnea(1.26), 
Gaya(1.25), Katihar(1.13), 
Nalanda(1.10), Rohtas(1.09) 
12.81 6.8 39.09 
0.5% to <= 1% 
Begusarai (1.00),  Saharsa (0.95), 
Saran ( 0.74), Aurangabad (0.72), 
Siwan (0.71), Bhagalpur + Banka 
(0.69), E. Champaran(0.64), Sheohar 
+ Sitamarhi (0.63), Munger (0.55), 
Madhubani ( 0.55) 
7.19 4.45 36.26 
0% to <= 0.5% 
Jehanabad + Arwal (0.50), Bhojpur 
(  0.46), Gopalganj (0.43), Jamui 
( 0.41), Madhepura +Supaul (0.36), 
Kaimur (0.31), Khagaria (0.30), 
Nawada (0.26), Samastipur (0.24), 
Lakhisarai + Sheikhpura (0.24), Buxar 
(0.22), Araria (0.15), Kishanganj 
(0.13) 
4.01 3.24 30.25 
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Total (100)  100.00  100.00  28.16  
 
Table 2.7: District Wise Contribution to Economic Growth in Bihar 
District  
Contribution 
to Total 
Growth (%) 
Average 
(%) 
Share 
of 
GSDP  
CV 
Single largest Contribution
 Patna (23.72)  
23.72  24.09  12.37 
4 %-5% Contribution  
 Muzaffarpur (4.84), Bhagalpur (4.72), 
Madhubani(4.09)  
13.64  12.3  13.6 
3% - 4% Contribution  
Begusarai (3.8), Madhepura (3.42), Gaya(3.26),  
E. Champaran (3.26), Darbhanga (3.25), Saran 
(3.16) Rohtas(3.09), Katihar (3.06)  
26.3  23.75  13.59 
2% - 3% Contribution  
 Purnea (2.74), Vaishali(2.54), Nalanda(2.37),  W. 
Champaran (2.27), Bhojpur(2.05), Samastipur 
(2.04), Jehanabad(2.02)  
16.03  17.48  11.67 
1% - 2% Contribution  
 Araria (1.9), Sitamarhi (1.89), Saharsa(1.88), 
Munger (1.84), Aurangabad (1.55), Gopalganj 
19.46  19.64  12.41 
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(1.55), Khagaria (1.46), Nawada (1.33), 
Kaimur(1.26), Kishanganj (1.26), Buxer(1.24), 
Jamui(1.17), Lakhisarai (1.13)  
0 – 1% Contribution  
 Siwan (0.85)  
0.85  2.6  7.71 
Total (100)  100  100  12.22 
 
Table 2.8: Spread of Tax Buoyancy Across Districts 
Tax Buoyancy estimate 
( from 2001‐02 to 2009‐
10)  
Districts  
More than 1.3  Katihar , Jehanabad + Arwal, Madhepura +Supaul, 
Jamui , Sheohar + Sitamarhi  
1.1 to 1.3  
Madhubani, Bhojpur , Aurangabad , Saran, 
Muzaffarpur, Kisanganj, Saharsa, Darbhanga , 
Nalanda , Vaishali  
1 to 1.1  West Champaran , Purnea, Munger, Rohtas, Araria , 
Nawada, Patna, Buxar , Kaimur, Gopalgang  
0.5  to 1.0  
Lakhisarai + Sheikhpura, Bhagalpur + Banka, East 
Champaran , Samastipur, Gaya , Khagaria , Siwan , 
Begusarai  
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Table 2.9: Classification of Districts According to Volatility of Commercial Tax 
Collection 
High Volatility  
(Above 51) 
Begusarai (126) /Madhepura +Supaul (98) /Araria 
(97) /Buxar (95) /Kaimur (94) /Bhojpur 
(80)/Samastipur (78) /Saran (76) /Katihar (73) 
/Sheohar + Sitamarhi (60) /Nawada (58) /Nalanda 
(57) /Saharsa (56) 
Average 
Volatility  
(40-51) 
Munger (51) /Aurangabad (51) /                   W. 
Champaran (46) /Gopalganj (45) /    Purnea (42) 
/Bhagalpur + Banka (41) /Kishanganj (41) 
Low Volatility  
(less than 40) 
Lakhisarai + Sheikhpura (39) / Jehanabad + Arwal 
(34) / Madhubani (33) /Darbhanga (31) /Vaishali (26) 
/Gaya (25) /Rohtas (24) /         E. Champaran (23) / 
Siwan (22)/Khagaria (19)/Muzaffarpur (16) /Jamui 
(7)/ Patna (4) 
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 76 percent of the growth in tax collection after implementation of VAT 
rationalisation is accounted for by Patna district. The rest 37 districts together 
account for just 24% of the growth (Table 2.6 and 2.7). Post-VAT, there has been 
a negative impact on elasticity in most districts with significantly volatile tax 
collection patterns (Table 2.8 and Table 2.9). This is in keeping with the recent 
trend of led lopsided and highly volatile economic growth in its regional 
dimensions. 
Consumption based rationale for VAT abstracts away from the issues of regional 
disparity within the state in its assumption of  an uniform tax spread within the 
state in the projection of its potential gains. Thus it completely ignores the 
structural constraints of low-income states like Bihar with limited diversification 
of the economy. Such issues of spread are not just confined to low-income states 
like Bihar. Bulk of the resources of states like Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra 
are accounted for by Hyderabad and Mumbai areas. 
Together, the commodity and district spread demonstrates that the existing debate 
on a shift to Goods and Services Tax (where concerns of equity has been confined 
to polemics around whether food should be taxed) and the assumptions on which 
VAT had been implemented, has failed to take into account the structural limits of 
the consumption base of a primarily agrarian low income economy. It also 
demonstrates the tenuous links between economic growth   and tax mobilisation.  
 
III What Determines District Level Variations in Tax Collection in Bihar? 
The following experiment is aimed towards ascertaining the causal determinants 
of district level variations in tax collection in Bihar. This exercise is based on a 
panel data comprising of district level commodity-wise commercial tax collection, 
dealer information and district level sectoral GDP for the last five years. Using 
simple regression techniques we construct three sets of indicators which would 
reflect the relative weight of the three factors: 
1. Structure of the district’s economy and its consumption base which 
would determine its taxable consumption base  
2. The room for increasing administrative efficiency taking on board the 
constraints of path dependency  
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3. The impact of the revised VAT of 2005 on collections in the past five 
years despite 1 and 2 above.     
Tax revenue in a predominantly rural agrarian economy like Bihar with sales and 
purchases being concentrated in small trading hubs at the district level mainly 
depends on the following: 
1. Agricultural growth which determines purchasing power across social 
classes and thus determines the extent of private consumption. 
2. Growth in major non-agricultural sectors which determines volumes of 
taxable transactions in the economy. 
These two together determine what can be termed the quantum of ‘growth effect’ 
on the tax base.  
However, there are two other factors which often tend to have a more determining 
role in the levels of actual tax collection. These are:  
3.  The role of the tax administration determined by complex institutional 
factors in mobilising tax resources in a particular tax administration unit or 
circle. 
4. The assumed inherent efficiency of VAT in the existing policy framework 
as an incentive based tax which leads to higher tax mobilisation.   
Method 
Estimating the Growth Effect on Tax Collection 
Step I 
Agricultural Growth Factor (AGF): For each district, agricultural growth factor is 
calculated by multiplying trend growth rate of agriculture with average sector 
share of agriculture. The ratio of this product to trend growth rate of agriculture in 
Bihar is the first indicator of the relative importance of agricultural growth on the 
districts tax base. 
Thus AGF for ith district is 
AGFi = (Giagr *Wiagr) /Gagr 
where  
Giagr = Trend growth rate of agriculture in ith district 
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Wiagr   = Average sector share of agriculture in the district’s economy 
Gagr    =   Trend growth of agriculture in the state. 
Step II 
Non-agricultural Composite Growth Factor (NACGF): For each district, the 
contribution of the major sectors which explain the economic growth pattern of 
the district and indicate the volume of taxable transactions is calculated as 
follows: 
NACGFi = (Gicomp*Wicomp) /Gcomp 
Gicomp= Trend growth rate of output  in manufacturing, trade, construction, 
electricity, transport & storage, communication, real estate and public 
administration in ith district 
Wicomp   = Average sector share of the above in the district’s economy 
Gcomp   =   Trend growth of the output in the sectors mentioned above in the state. 
Note: This sectors have been identified on the basis of the investigators’ earlier 
work on Bihar’s growth which show that these sectors together determine more 
than 90 percent of Bihar’s annual growth (Das Gupta 2010). It must be noted that 
the purpose of this exercise is largely indicative and the numbers generated 
through this exercise show the relative impact of Bihar’s agricultural and non-
agricultural growth in every district (See Appendix II for a detailed algebraic 
account).  
 
Further, the buoyancy factor at district level is incorporated in the growth factor; 
the AGF and NACGF are modified as follows: 
Modified AGFi = AGFi  * TBi 
Modified NACGFi = NACGFi  * TBi 
where TBi is Tax buoyancy of district i for the FY 2009-10 
Estimating the Tax Administration’s Impact on Tax Collection 
Step III 
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Appendix I shows the lack of correlation between growth and tax elasticity at the 
district level in Bihar. Once the growth factor contributing to tax elasticity is 
estimated in Step 3, the importance of VAT performance at the district level can 
be isolated by the relative shares of each district in the state’s total tax collection 
in the post-VAT period. This is estimated by: 
VATFi = Share of District i in total tax collection during 2009-10 
Step IV 
For district i, average collection over the period of analysis (2006-07 to 2009-10) 
can be represented as  
TCi = AGFi*x1i + NACGFi*x2i + VATFi*x3i + TAFi*x4i 
Where AGFi + NACGFi + VATFi + TAFi = 100 
And xji  ( j = 1, 2, 3, 4) represents the contribution of each of the above factors to 
total tax base of ith district. 
Data and Econometric Analysis 
For this experiment, the following datasets have been used: 
1. Projections of district level sectoral GDP figures (1999-2000 series) based 
on data from Directorate of Statistics and Evaluation, Government of 
Bihar. 
2. Estimates of state level sectoral GSDP figures (1999-2000 series) based on 
data from Directorate of Statistics and Evaluation, Government of Bihar. 
3. Circle wise and commodity wise commercial tax collection figures (2006-
07 to 2009-10) based on actual figures sourced from the Department of 
Commercial Tax, Government of Bihar.Tax circle wise collection figures 
are mapped on to districts to enable analysis of growth impact. 
4. We measure the composite impact of both trend annual changes (real 
growth/decline) in collection for each category for the period 2006-07 to 
2009-10; as well as the relative share   of each category in the total 
VAT/Bihar Sales Tax pool of Bihar. 
5. We measure buoyancy trends at the district level for the period under 
consideration after adjusting for inflation. 
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Result 
 
Figure 3A Combination of Factors in Each District in Explaining Tax 
Mobilisation 
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The results of the experiment overwhelmingly reflects that apart from Patna, 
which is the relatively developed trading centre in Bihar, the incentive impact of 
VAT has not had any substantial impact in explaining tax collection patterns at 
the district level in Bihar. The impact of the non-agricultural composite growth 
factor which includes the sectors leading Bihar’s growth (outlined in Section I) 
have had no significant impact in mobilisation of tax resources.  The agricultural 
growth factor is mildly significant in a few districts. The single most factor which 
stands out in explaining district level variations in tax mobilisation is the role of 
the district level tax administration. Given the lack of significant outlays on 
institutions of taxation outlined in Section II above,    
To conclude, the link between economic growth and policy reforms in public 
finance in contemporary Bihar are tenuous. Bihar’s growth acceleration precedes 
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the ‘policy reforms’ in public finance. This public finance paradigm based on the 
‘good governance’ agenda initiated since 2005-06 has been largely ineffective. 
The two key constraints on sustaining efforts to close Bihar’s development gap 
with the rest of India stems from the nature of the growth process in its regional, 
sectoral and social dimensions and the contradictory means and ends of the 
‘policy reforms’ in public finance. Together, this has not only led to a situation 
where economic growth has not added any resources to the public coiffeurs of the 
state but has also led to the ineffective role of tax institutions of the state due to 
occlusion in public policy.   
---------- 
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